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market data set obtained from the toilette paper category in which a major 
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INTRODUCTION
Quite often, we hear on the news that a retailer has asked its 
manufacturers to reduce the wholesale prices of their products. 
While small manufacturers are forced to accept the retailer’s 
demand, some big manufacturers have the power to refuse 
the retailer’s unfair request. Sometimes in the extreme case, 
manufacturers decide to stop supplying their products to the 
retailer who asks for unacceptably low prices. This is especially the 
case with the consumer goods market. This might be because of a 
relatively low level of differentiation and fierce competition among 
manufacturers. The power game between giant manufacturers and 
mega-retailers has been one of great interest to both marketing 
researchers and marketing managers. As retailers become bigger, 
they have begun to exert influence on the manufacturers who have 
taken the leadership stemming from their high market shares. 
Moreover, retailers have attempted to obtain a dominant position by 
introducing private labels, which fight against national brands with 
lower prices. Manufacturers have responded through aggressive 
promotions and new product introduction to defend their profits. 
For the last few decades, both sides have tried to take the leadership 
in channel interaction like this. It seems that they have maintained 
a narrow equilibrium, so the marginal changes in market structure 
are likely to affect the power balance between manufacturers and 
retailers. In this sense, the changes in market structure are worthy 
of investigation to understand the nature of vertical relationship. 
This study tries to uncover the nature of channel interactions in 
terms of the pricing behavior of retailer and manufacturer before 
and after an event that seems to have a considerable impact on 
competitive nature in the market such as a merger and a new brand 
entry.
On July 15, 1995, a merger between the Kimberly-Clark 
Corporation and the Scott Paper Company was announced. 
Kimberly-Clark was one of the largest consumer products companies 
in the U.S, whose product portfolio includes facial tissue, toilet 
tissue, and diapers. Scott was also one of the leading manufacturers 
of tissue products, such as toilet tissue, paper towels, and paper 
napkins. As a result of the merger, a new giant tissue company was 
born. This company seemed to hold equal power in the market with 
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the other major player, Procter & Gamble (P&G). At the time of the 
merger, the combined company had approximately half of the facial 
tissue market and one quarter of the toilet tissue market (All the 
figures―market share and market size―come from the article of July 
18, 1995 “Scott’s Dunlap: no paper tiger” in The Free Lance-Star). 
Among paper product industries, the toilet paper market was the 
biggest market in the U.S., amounting to $2.96 billion sales in 1994. 
Kimberly had the second highest market share in the toilet tissue 
market as a result of the merger. Therefore, it is expected that some 
changes among market participants, both large and small, occurred. 
For example, Kimberly might behave more aggressively by utilizing 
more plentiful resources than before, or they might act collusively 
with other major players. In addition to a change in the relationship 
among the manufacturers of toilet tissue, Kimberly’s stance on their 
relationship with retailers is also likely to change after the merger.
Such an event provides an ideal opportunity to study the impact 
of a merger on strategic interactions among channel members. 
This study examines the pricing behaviors of both the retailer and 
manufacturer in the toilet tissue market, using the new empirical 
industrial organization (NEIO) framework. We compare the pricing 
behaviors in the pre-merger market with those in the post-merger 
market to test  alternative scenarios. The merger could make the 
competition between manufactures more intense, which would 
lead them to behave more cooperatively with retailers. They could 
lower their wholesale prices, enduring the decline of their margins. 
Otherwise, the decrease in the number of manufacturers would 
allow manufactures to have more power against retailers than they 
had before the merger. The merger could have a different impact on 
each manufacturer.
This study shows that channel members interact with one 
another and changes in market structure have an impact on 
which party seizes the market pricing initiative. We find that the 
merged manufacturer price more competitively for its brand after 
the merger. Many studies have examined the interactions between 
channel members and the effects of the merger and our study can 
also contribute to the literature by adding knowledges on the impact 
of a manufacturer level merger on the relationship among vertical 
channel members. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we 
discuss the related literature. In the third section, we present our 
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model followed by the description of the estimation strategy in 
section 4. In section 5, we introduce the data. Section 6 presents the 
results of the study and section 7 concludes the paper.
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
We investigate the changes in the pricing behaviors of one 
common retailer and manufacturers within NEIO framework. The 
NEIO framework allow us to evaluate the impact of a firm’s strategic 
marketing decisions on other market participants’ strategic decisions 
as well as on consumer demands (Kadiyali et al. 2001). A large 
amount of theoretical research has been conducted to study specific 
industries rather than using cross-sectional data across industries. 
These theoretical works reveal that market outcomes are affected 
by industry and firm-specific demand and cost characteristics that 
are difficult to model in the cross-sectional analysis (Kadiyali et al. 
2001). As a result, researchers have focused on studying specific 
industries. The NEIO literature incorporates more industry- and 
firm-specific details in modeling demand, cost, and competition, to 
capture the possible heterogeneity across industries (Kadiyali et al. 
2001). Another distinct characteristic of NEIO is to use structural 
econometric models. According to Chintagunta et al. (2006), the 
structural models rely on economic and/or marketing theories of 
consumer or firm behavior to derive the econometric specification 
that can be taken to data. In particular, structural models are 
typically derived based on optimizing behavior of agents such as 
utility maximizing behaviors by consumers and profit maximizing 
behaviors by firms.  
Choi (1991) is among the first researchers who investigate the 
price competition in a market with a common retailer. His theoretical 
model considers three noncooperative games with different power 
structures—vertical Nash, manufacturer Stackelberg, and retailer 
Stackelberg. He assumes that competition between manufacturers 
is Bertrand Nash. Utilizing Choi’s framework Besanko et al. 
(1998) empirically study the pricing behaviors of retailers and 
manufacturers. They use the vertical Nash model among the three 
scenarios of Choi to describe the noncooperative interactions 
between oligopolistic manufacturers and the common retailer. Their 
work reveals the importance of incorporating endogeneity in price 
The Impact of Horizontal Merger Between Manufacturers on Channel Pricing Behaviors 129
to make unbiased inferences on demand. Sudhir (2001) studies 
manufacturers’ pricing behaviors in the presence of a strategic 
retailer. He assumed two scenarios—vertical Nash and manufacturer 
Stackelberg. His model is applied to the market data obtained from 
the yogurt and the peanut butter categories. He finds manufacturer 
Stackelberg game best fits the data, and the manufacturer pricing is 
tacitly collusive. The categories he studies are highly concentrated, 
so a cooperative outcome can be achieved in noncooperative game 
because it is easy to punish the firm that deviates from cooperative 
behavior. Villas-Boas (2007) investigates the vertical relationship 
between manufacturer and retailer. She assumes seven different 
scenarios, including manufacturer-Stackelberg, manufacturer 
collusion, and retailer collusion. She finds that the models assuming 
zero wholesale margin, in which retailers make pricing decisions, 
are supported by data and that the retail pricing may lie between 
Bertrand Nash and collusive retail pricing. This result is consistent 
with the high bargaining power of retailers that forces wholesale 
prices down to marginal cost. 
Kadiyali et al. (2000) utilize the conduct parameter approach, 
extending Choi’s model in three ways. First, they introduce a more 
general model of interactions between manufacturers instead of 
assuming Bertrand Nash game. Second, their model allows for 
heterogeneity in manufacturer-retailer interaction while Choi 
implicitly assumes that all manufacturers follow the same game 
rule. For instance, depending on the channel power and pricing 
strategies, some manufacturers might be Stackelberg leaders 
whereas other manufacturers are Stackelberg followers. Finally, 
they utilize the conduct parameter approach. Stackelberg games are 
not nested in the conduct parameter model, whereas Nash is nested 
in the conduct parameter model. They apply their model to market 
data on refrigerated juice and tuna and find that the retailer had 
pricing power. Chintagunta et al. (2002) investigate the effects of 
store brand introduction on retailer demand and pricing behavior. 
They examine whether manufacturer-retailer interaction changes 
after the introduction of a store brand by estimating demand and 
pricing equations twice—before and after store-brand entry. They 
find that the national-brand manufacturers appear to behave in a 
more accommodating manner after the introduction of store-brand. 
There is extensive literature on the topic of horizontal mergers 
in the field of in economics. While many studies focus on antitrust 
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issues resulting from mergers, some studies investigate horizontal 
mergers from different points of view. For example, Salant et al. 
(1983) study losses from horizontal mergers, assuming a Cournot 
equilibrium. They argue that there is the possibility that mergers 
reduce the joint profits of the merging parties because merging firms 
contract their output while other firms in the market expand. Perry 
and Porter (1985) discuss the incentives for horizontal merger in an 
oligopolistic industry. They claim that since new firms have access 
to the combined resources of both firms, mergers can be profitable 
in many circumstances. There are studies analyzing Kimberly-Scott 
merger case. The study of Hausman and Leonard (1997) is one of 
them. Like typical papers focusing on antitrust issues, they also 
focus on the effect of the merger on price level. They investigate 
whether unilateral effects arise after merger. Unilateral effects 
arise when the products of the merging parties place significant 
competitive constraints on each other prior to the merger. The 
merged firm may then be able to raise prices post-merger. They 
conclude that no unilateral effects arose after Kimberly bought 
Scott, which means that there was no price increase after the 
merger.
THE MODEL 
This paper investigate pricing behaviors of channel members 
before and after horizontal mergers between manufacturers. We 
estimate the parameters of demand equation first, and then use 
these parameters to recover price-cost margin from pricing equation 
under the different scenarios. We use the same set of scenarios 
as in Choi (1991)—vertical Nash, manufacturer Stackelberg, and 
retailer Stackelberg. In addition to these three scenarios, we also 
estimate the conduct parameter model  because there is a possibility 
that the three discrete games are not sufficient to capture a wide 
enough range of possible interactions. We estimate cost coefficients 
and conduct parameters twice with pre-merger data and post-
merger data as done in Chintagunta et al. (2002). However, when 
we estimate demand parameters we do not divide the data into 
two parts because we expect consumer behavior is unlikely to be 
influenced by the merger between manufacturers. This particularly 
makes sense because Kimberly decided to maintain the brand 
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“Scott,” so there was no outward change in the toilet tissue market 
after the merger in consumer’s point of view.
Demand Equations
The demand model used in this paper is similar to that of 
Chintagunta et al. (2002). We start from the specification of the 
utility function consumers who are possibly heterogeneous in 
preferences. The utility of consumer i from choosing brand j at time 
t is given as follows:
choosing brand j at time t is given as follows:
,            (1)
where  is the price of brand j at time t,  is a dummy variable which 
equals one if brand j is sold on a promotion such as bonus buy, or price 
reduction at time t,  is consumer specific price sensitivity,  is a 
brand-specific preference parameter, and  is the sensitivity to the retailer's 
deal activity.  is a mean zero demand shock. This unobserved demand 
shock is specific to each store, each brand, and each time period. Since it 
comes from factors such as changes in shelf location and other unobserved 
promotions than ones included in ,  can be correlated with the prices. 
 indicates the consumer-, brand-, and time-specific error term that is 
observed by consumer, but not by researchers. We also include a time 
dummy for every three month that can capture overall demand shock affecting 
all the stores. Besides error term , we allow for consumer heterogeneity 
with respect to intrinsic brand preferences and price sensitivity by introducing 
random coefficients for intrinsic brand preferences ( ) and for price 
sensitivity ( ). We assume that these parameters are distributed according to 
a multivariate normal distribution. However, we impose some restrictions on 
parameters of the heterogeneity distribution because unconstrained 
variance-covariance matrix requires the estimation of a larger number of 
parameters. Specifically, we impose the following structure on heterogeneity 
parameters to reduce the model parameters while keeping the heterogeneity 
structure as flexible as possible: 
       (2)
In this specification,  is the mean value of preference of brand j,  is a 
variance component that varies by both consumers and brands,  is the mean 
value of price sensitivity, and  is a variance component that varies by 
consumers. , and  are parameters to be estimated. Consequently, the 
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In this specification, αi is the mean value of preference of brand 
j, νij is a variance component that varies by both consumers and 
brands, β is the mean value of price sensitivity, and νiβ is a variance 
component that varies by consumers. αj, β, ρj, and ρβ are parameters 
to be estimated. Consequently, the implied variance of αij is ρ
2
j and 
that of β is ρ2β. With this heterogeneity distribution, we estimate 
much less number of mean parameters and covariance parameters. 
One can rewrite the utility function in equation (1) in the following 
form:
implied variance of  is  and that of  is . With this heterogeneity 
distribution, we estimate much less number of mean parameters and 
covariance parameters. O e can r write he utility fu ction in equation (1) in 
the following form: 
.      (3)
where  is the utility common to all consumers and the remaining terms 
reflect individual taste. 
Specification of the demand system is completed with the option of an 
"outside good". The introduction of an outside good allows for the possibility 
that consumers decide not to purchase any of the brands. The indirect utility 
for the outside good is given as follows:
,        (4)
where  is set to zero. The mean utilities of included brands can be 
identified and estimated relative to the mean utilities of the outside good.
In terms of the distribution of idiosyncratic error term  and , we assume 
they are identically and independently distributed with a Type 1 extreme value 
distribution. Given this assumption, the probability of consumer i purchasing 
brand j at time t is given by the multinomial logit model:
,        (5)
where  and J is the number of brands in the 
category.  The market level demand are obtained by aggregating the 
individual-level choice probabilities over all consumers in a given time t. 
While the homogenous logit model suffers from the well known independence 
of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property, the market level demand from our 
model is free from the IIA property since consumer taste parameter is 
modeled as heterogenous. This heterogenous logit model results in more 
flexible substitution patterns between brands than homogeneous logit model. 
 (3)
where δjt is the utility common to all consumers and the remaining 
terms reflect individual taste. 
Specification of the demand system is completed with the option 
of an “outside good.” The introduction of an outside good allows for 
the possibility that consumers ecide not to purchase any of the 
brands. The indirect utility for the outside good is given as follows:
implied variance of  is  and that of  is . With this heterogeneity 
distribution, we estimate much less number of mean parameters a d 
covariance parameters. On  can rewrite the utility function in equation (1) in 
the following form: 
.      (3)
where  is the utility common to all consumers and the remaining terms 
reflect individual ta te. 
Specification of the de and system is completed with the option of an 
"outside good". The introduction of an outsid  good allows for the possibility 
that consumers deci e not to purchase any of the brand . The indirect utility 
for the outside good is given as follows:
,        (4)
where  is set to zero. The mean utilities of included brands can be 
identified and estimated relative to the mean utilities of the outside good.
In terms of th  distribution of idiosyncratic error term  and , we assume 
they are identically and independently distributed with a Type 1 extreme valu  
distribution. Given th s assumpt on, the probab lity of consumer i purchasing 
brand j at t me t is g  by the multin mial logit model:
,        (5)
where  and J is the number of brands in the 
category.  The market level demand are obtained by aggregating the 
individual-level choice prob bilities over all consumers in a given tim  t. 
While the homogenous logit model suffers fr m the well known dependence 
of irrelevant alt rnatives (IIA) property, the market level demand from our 
model is f e  from the IIA property since consu e  ast  para eter is 
modeled as heterog nous. This heterogenous logit model results in more 
flexible substitution patterns between brands than h mogeneous l git model. 
        (4)
where αi 0 is set to zero. The mean utilities of included brands can be 
identified and estimated relative to the mean utilities of the outside 
good.
In terms of the distribution of idiosyncratic error term εijt and εi 0t, 
we assume they are identically and independently distributed with 
a Type 1 extreme value distribution. Given this assumption, the 
probability of consumer i purchasing brand j at time t is given by 
the multinomial logit model:
implied variance of  is  nd that of  is . With this heterogeneity 
distribution, we estimate much less number of mean parameters and 
covariance parameters. One can rewrite the utility function in equation (1) in 
the following form: 
.      (3)
where  is the utility common to all consumers and the remaining terms 
reflect individual taste. 
Specification of the demand system is completed with the option of an 
"outside good". The introduction of an outside good allows for the possibility 
that consumers decide not to purchase any of the brands. The indirect utility 
for the outside good is given as follows:
,        (4)
where  is set to zero. The mean utilities of included brands can be 
identified and estimated relative to the mean utilities of the outside good.
In terms of the distribution of idiosyncratic error term  and , we assume 
they are identically and independently distributed with a Type 1 extreme value 
distribution. Given this assumption, the probability of consumer i purchasing 
brand j at time t is given by the multinomial logit model:
,        (5)
where  and J is the number of brands in the 
category.  The market level demand are obtained by aggregating the 
individual-level choice probabilities over all consumers in a given time t. 
While the homogenous logit model suffers from the well known independence 
of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property, the market level demand from our 
model is free from the IIA property since consumer taste parameter is 
modeled as heterogenous. This heterogenous logit model results in more 
flexible substitution patterns between brands than homogeneous logit model. 
        (5)
where Vijt = αij + βi pjt + γdjt + μjt and J is the number of brands in 
the category. Th  arket l vel demand are obtained by aggregating 
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market level demand from our model is free from the IIA property 
since consumer taste parameter is modeled as heterogenous. This 
heterogenous logit model results in more flexible substitution 
patterns between brands than homogeneous logit model. 
Pricing Equations
The supply side equations are derived from the pricing decisions 
of the retailer and the manufacturers. The retailer chooses a retail 
price which maximizes the retail level category profit and each 
manufacturer picks the profit maximizing wholesale prices of its 
own products. We investigate how channel members interacted with 
one another before the merger and after the merger respectively and 
apply both the menu approach and the conduct parameter approach 
discussed in section two. First, we examine three possible scenarios: 
vertical Nash, manufacturer Stackelberg, and retailer Stackelberg. 
Interactions between manufacturers are assumed to be Bertrand 
Nash.
In vertical Nash (VN) game, each manufacturer chooses its 
wholesale price conditional on both the retailer’s margin on its own 
product and the observed retail prices of the competing brands. 
The retailer determines the margin of each brand conditional on 
the respective wholesale prices (Choi 1991). Let there be one retailer 
and N multi-brand manufacturers competing in the market. The 
retailer’s profit function in time t is given by
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where  is retail price of brand j at store s at time t,  is wholesale 
price of brand j,  is the retailer's marginal cost of brand j at store s at 
time t,  is the market share of brand j, and  is market size of store s 
at time t. Since the data we use include the sales records of individual stores 
that cover the local market, we assume that each store determines its own 
retail price. Thus, we use subscript "s" for store-specific variable. The first 
order conditions, assuming vertical Nash equilibrium in price, are given by
.        (7)
In vector notation, the first-order conditions become
,
where  and  are J×1 vectors of market shares, retail prices, wholesale 
        (6)
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In vector notation, the first-order conditions become
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Using estimates of the demand parameters, we can compute the price-cost 
margin of the retailer. The marginal cost of the retailer is modeled as 
 where  is brand-specific marginal cost,  is 
store-specific marginal cost,  is labor cost of retailing at time t,  is 
coefficient of the cost variable, and  is an error term that is the marginal 
cost unobserved by the researcher, but observed by the retailer. 
We derive a manufacturer's markup equations in a similar manner Each 
manufacturer chooses the wholesale prices that maximize its profit. There are 
N manufacturer level profit functions 
      (9)
In the above equation,  denotes the set of products that manufacturer m 
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where Tm is the manufacturer m’s ownership matrix with the 
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The Manufacturer-Stackelberg (MS) scenario models a market in 
which each manufacturer chooses the wholesale price takeing into 
account the response function of the retailer, conditional on the 
observed wholesale price of the competitor’s product. The retailer 
determines the price of each product given the respective wholesale 
prices (Choi 1991). As for the retailer’s margins in MS game, they 
are the same as those in VS case because the retailer’s strategy 
is to choose the best price in response to wholesale prices set by 
manufacturers in MS games as well as in VN game. Manufacturers 
do not change their wholesale prices in response to retailer’s price 
setting behavior. On the other hand, the manufacturers’ markups 
change. Each manufacturer decides its wholesale price to maximize 
profit from all the products that it possesses, knowing that retailer 
behaves according to equation (7). The first-order condition of each 
brand is as follows:
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terms and solving for the manufacturers' price-cost margin yields
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its wholesale price conditional on both the retailer’s margin on its 
own brands and the observed retail prices of the competing brands. 
The retailer chooses the margin of each brand using the reaction 
functions of all ma ufacturers (Choi 1991). Contrary to MS game, 
the manufacturer’s markup in RS is the same as one in VN game 
and the retailer’s markup is different from that in VN scenario. 
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respect to retail price of brand j at store r, we obtain equation (17) 
using the implicit function theorem.
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function theorem.
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Now let us present the conduct parameter model. Introducing a 
conduct parameter makes the pricing equation different. The first-
order condition of retailer’s pricing equation is
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price of brand j at store r, we obtain equation (17) using the implicit 
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Now let us present the conduct parameter model. Introducing a conduct 
parameter makes the pricing equation different. The first-order condition of 
retailer’s pricing equation is
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where rjst = jst – wjt – c
r
jst and θ (wj, rj ) = ∂wj/∂rj . θ (wj, rj ) is called as a 
“conduct parameter.” This parameter represents how manufacturers 
respond to the change in retailer margin. When vertical Nash is 
assumed, these parameters equal zero, and equation (19) becomes 
same with equation (7). Kadiyali et al. (2001) estimate the conduct 
parameters that capture the response of manufacturer in response 
to changes in other brands’ retail margin, ∂wj/∂r k(k ≠ j ), as well as 
those that capture the response of manufacturer in response to 
changes in retail margin of own products. However, we assume those 
conduct parameters to be zero for the sake of simplicity because 
we have six brands, which requires estimation of 36 conduct 
parameters. This simplification assumes that manufacturers do not 
react to the changes in other brands’ retailer margins. The pricing 
equations of manufacturers in the conduct parameter model are 
given as follows:
where  and .  is called as a "conduct 
parameter". This parameter represents how manufacturers respond to the 
change in retailer margin. When vertical Nash is assumed, these parameters 
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manufacturer in response to changes in other brands’ retail margin, 
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response to changes in ret il margin of own products. However, w  assume 
those conduct parameters to be zero for the sake of simplicity because we 
have six brands, which requires estimation of 36 conduct par meters. This 
simplification assumes that manufacturers do not react to the changes in other 
brands' retailer margins. The pricing equa ions of manufacturers in the conduct 
parameter model are given as follows:
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where . This parameter indicates how retailer behaves in response 
to the change in wholesale price. We also assume that the conduct parameters 
which represent the reaction of retailer and manufacturers in response to 
changes in the other brands’ wholesale prices equal zero, .
Therefore, we estimate only six conduct parameters. However, note that 
assumption that the interactions among manufacturers are Bertrand competition 
might be unrealistic at least between Kleenex and Scott because they are 
produced by the same company after the merger. Therefore, we assume that 
 and  are not zero post-merger*. It means that Kimberly 
adjust the wholesale price of Scott when they change the wholesale price of 
Kleenex, or vice versa. As noted before, the conduct parameters are zero in 
* The subscript "kl" and "sc" denote Kleenex and Scott, respectively.
 (20)
where θ (rj, wj ) = ∂rj/∂wj. This parameter indicates how retailer 
behaves in response to the change in wholesale price. We also 
assume that the conduct parameters which represent the reaction 
of retailer and manufacturers in response to changes in the other 
brands’ wholesale prices equal zero, ∂pj/∂wk = 0, (k ≠ j ). Therefore, 
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we estimate only six conduct parameters. As noted before, the 
conduct parameters are zero in vertical Nash scenario. For the 
values of θ between 0 and -1, the retailer and manufacturers make 
higher margins than those under VN game and for values greater 
than 0, the margins are below those corresponding to VN.
ESTIMATION PROCEDURE
We utilize the estimation procedures by Berry et al. (1995) and 
Nevo (2001) in estimating demand parameters. We follow a two-step 
approach utilized by Chintagunta et al. (2002) and also by Villas-
Boas (2007). In the first step, we estimate the parameters of demand 
equation, and then using these estimated parameters, we compute 
margins of the retailer and the manufacturers and estimate 
coefficients of cost and conduct parameters as the second step. 
This procedure makes the estimation procedure simple because 
the demand equation is not needed to be re-estimated whenever 
different market structures are tested. More importantly demand 
parameters are not affected by possible misspecification in the 
supply side. 
One important issue in parameter estimation is the consumer 
heterogeneity. Since we have market-level data that contain brand 
shares, price, and promotion activities at store-level, we do not 
observe individual brand choices. Our parameter estimation would 
involve comparison between observed market shares and predicted 
market shares by integrating consumer level choice probabilities 
using consumer heterogeneity distribution as implicit weights. We 
rely on the simulation method in order to aggregate consumer level 
probabilities. The estimation consists of the following steps:
Step 1. Pick starting values for the set of parameters θ2 = {ρj, ρβ). 
These parameters are labelled as nonlinear parameters as they are 
subject to nonlinear search in the optimization procedure to be 
discussed later, we distinguish these from the linear parameters.
Step 2. Make R draws from distribution of ν = {νij, νiβ } ~ N(0, 1).
Step 3. Given the values of θ2, numerically compute δ that equates 
observed brand shares to predicted shares by using the contraction 
mapping suggested by Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes. (1995).  
Step 4. Estimate parameters included in δjt, θ1 = {αj, β, γ}. These 
parameters can be estimated easily by regression. However, μjt is an 
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error term and possibly correlated with prices, so we use two-stage 
least squares.
Step 5. Compute moment conditions by interacting the error term, 
μjt, obtained from the two-stage least squares with instrumental 
variables. Then the GMM estimator can be obtained by minimizing 
the GMM objective function as follows: 
by Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes. (1995).  
Step 4. Estimate parameters included in , . These parameters 
can be estimated easily by regression. However,  is an error term and 
possibly correlated with prices, so we use two-stage least squares.
Step 5. Compute moment conditions by interacting the error term, ,
obtained from the two-stage least squares with instrumental variables. Then 
the GMM estimato  can be obtained by minimizing the GMM objective 
function as follows: 
     (21)
where Z is instrumental variables, and A is the weighted matrix given by 
. Following Chintagunta et al. (2002), we adjust the demand 
equation based on the information on average demographics for each store in 
order to allow for systematic store-level differences in brand preferences and 
price sensitivity. Specifically, the brand preferences and price sensitivities for 
consumer i at store s are given by 
      (22)
where  indicates the average demographics for store s, and  and 
represent coefficient of interactions between brand preferences and price 
sensitivity with store-level demographics. 
Using the values of parameters estimated in the first step, we compute 
price-cost margins of retailer and manufacturers under three assumed market 
structures. The markups are easily computed with estimated market shares and 
the first derivatives of shares with respect to retail prices. Next, subtracting 
these markups from the observed retail (wholesale) prices generates marginal 
costs of the retailer (manufacturers),  ( ). And then we estimate parameters 
in cost equations, and  with ordinary least square, assuming 
that the error terms in cost equations are not correlated with brand and store 
dummies, and other cost variables.
In terms of the estimation of conduct parameter, we employ nonlinear least 
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demographics for each store in order to allow for systematic 
store-level differences in brand preferences and price sensitivity. 
Specifically, the brand preferences and price sensitivities for 
consumer i at store s are given by 
by Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes. (1995).  
Step 4. Estimate parameters included in , . These parameters 
can be estimated easily by regression. However,  is n error term and 
possibly correlated with prices, so we use two-stage least squares.
Step 5. Compute moment conditions by interacting the error term, ,
obtained from the two-stage least squares with instrumental variables. Then 
the GMM estimator can be obtained by minimizing the GMM objective 
function as follows: 
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where Z is instrumental variables, and A is the weighted matrix given by 
. Following Chintagunta et al. (2002), we adjust the demand 
equation based on the information on average demographics for each store in 
order to allow for systematic store-level differences in brand preferences and 
price sensitivity. Specifically, the brand preferences and price sensitivities for 
consumer i at store s are given by 
      (22)
where  indicates the average demographics for store s, and  and 
represent coefficient of interactions between brand preferences and price 
sensitivity with store-level demographics. 
Using the values of parameters estimated in the first step, we compute 
price-cost margins of retailer and manufacturers under three assumed market 
structures. The markups are easily computed with estimated market shares and 
the first derivatives of shares with respect to retail prices. Next, subtracting 
these markups from the observed retail (wholesale) prices generates marginal 
costs of the retailer (manufacturers),  ( ). And then we estimate parameters 
in cost equations, and  with ordinary least square, assuming 
that the error terms in cost equations are not correlated with brand and store 
dummies, and other cost variables.
In terms of the estimation of conduct parameter, we employ nonlinear least 
       (22)
where Xs indicates the average demographics for store s, and f j and 
f β represent coefficient of interactions between brand preferences 
and price sensitivity wi h store-level demographics. 
Using the values of parameters estimated in the first step, we 
compute price-cost margins of retailer and anufacturers under 
three assumed market structures. The markups are easily computed 
with estimated market shares and the first derivatives of shares 
with respect to retail prices. N xt, subtracting these markups from 
the observed retail (wholesale) prices generates marginal costs of the 
retailer (manufacturers), cr (cm ). And then we estimate parameters 
in cost equ tions, λrj, ψ
r
s, τ
r, λmj, and τ
m with o di ary least square, 
assuming that the error terms in cost equations are not correlated 
with brand and store dummies, and other cost variables.
In terms of the estimation of conduct parameter, we employ 
nonlinear le st squares, since the cond ct p ra eters enter 
nonlinearly in the pricing equations. The estimation strategy is to 
minimize the sum of squares, E(ω′ω). The logic used to obtain the 
stimates of the conduct parameters are similar to that applied 
to estimate demand parameters; linear parameters and nonlinear 
parameters are estimated separately. The first order condition of the 
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minimization problem with respect to λrj, ψ
r
s, τ
r, λmj, and τ
m are linear 
in these parameters. Thus, these linear parameters can be solved 
as a function of the conduct parameters with ordinary least square 
and plugged into the rest of the first-order conditions, limiting 
the nonlinear search to the conduct parameters only. We use the 
likelihood-ratio test for nested hypothesis and Vuong (1989) test for 
nonnested hypothesis to infer which game fits the data best.
 
DATA
We used store level scanner data from a large supermarket chain, 
Dominick’s Finer Foods. This data set is publically available at the 
webpages of Kilts Center at University of Chicago. The retail chain 
has 96 stores around Chicago, Illinois, and is one of the two largest 
supermarket chains in the area (Chintagunta et al. 2002). The 
scanner data contain weekly observations on units sales at the UPC 
level, retail and wholesale prices, promotion activities, and store 
traffic for each store. The data set also contains information on 
demographics of households for each store. 
Of the 399 weeks of available data, we choose to use two sets 
of 46-week long time series data; one set is for the pre-merger 
estimation from 06/30/94 to 06/28/95, and the other is for post-
merger from 01/04/96 to 01/01/97. Note that the merger was 
announced on July 15, 1995. The pre-merger sample contains the 
data from one year before the merger and the post-merger sample 
starts six months after the announcement of merger. The actual 
date the merger was finalized is December 12, 1995. Nevertheless, 
during six months after the announcement, the market had time 
to recover to equilibrium. All market participants such as retailers, 
competing firms, and consumers knew that the two companies 
would merge from the date of the announcement. Thus, we select 
the period just after the finalization of the merger contract. 
The toilet tissue data have sales records from 93 stores. We 
include six brands from the category for analysis. However, only 
the data of 73 stores were available for all the brands for the entire 
sample period. Moreover, the store demographic data are missing 
for three stores among 73. Thus, we remove observations from 23 
stores, and keep data from other 70 stores for analysis. There was 
no entry or exit of any brands during the estimation period.
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We aggregated the sales data at UPC level across both size (e.g., 
4 rolls and 12 rolls) and brand variant to brand level. We also make 
a definition on market size to compute the market share of the 
outside good.  We assume that every customer visiting the store may 
potentially purchases four rolls of toilet tissue which is the average 
package size of toilet tissue, i.e., the market size at store s at week t 
(Mst) = store traffic at store s during week t × average package size of 
toilet tissue. The brand level market share observations are obtained 
by dividing brand sales by the market size. 
As mentioned earlier we utilize information on the market 
characteristics for each of the 70 stores. For each store, we utilize 
information on the following five variables: (a) the fraction of the 
population that is educated, (b) the median income, (c) the average 
household size, (d) the fraction of the population that is unemployed, 
and (e) the average driving time to the store. We choose these 
variables because we expect those variables are related to cross-
store differences in consumer preferences as suggested by Hoch et 
al.  (1995). We use mean-centered measures in estimation.
We need exogenous variables to estimate parameters in the 
demand equation to account for the possible endogeneity in prices. 
The instruments we use are lagged retail prices, lagged wholesale 
prices, current values of the producer price indices (PPI) for the 
toilette tissue category and the average retail prices of other 
stores. Lagged retail price is unlikely correlated with the current 
demand shock. Sudhir (2001) also used lagged retail price as an 
instrument. Since lagged wholesale price and PPI reflect the costs 
of manufacturers, they are likely to be correlated with retail price, 
but uncorrelated with demand shock. Variables related to the 
manufacturer’s costs are widely used as an instrument for retail 
price (e.g. Chintagunta et al. 2002; Villas-Boas 2007). According to 
the study of Walters and MacKenzie (1998), loss leader promotion or 
in-store price specials in paper product categories (e.g., paper towels, 
toilet tissue) have no effect on store traffic. The stores are unlikely to 
respond to the activities of other stores because customers do not go 
to other stores due to the promotions. Thus, the demand shock in 
one specific store does not seem to affect the retail prices of the rest 
of the other stores. We interact those variables with brand dummies 
to generate brand specific instruments. In addition to these four 
variables, we also include all other exogenous explanatory variables 
as instruments.
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In the specification of the cost function, we include hourly wages 
of retailing for retailer’s cost function and those of manufacturing 
for manufacturers’ cost functions. These data gathered from Current 
Employment Statistics (CES) surveyed by Bureau of Labor Statistics 
in the U.S. In addition to the hourly wages, the PPI for pulp are used 
as a cost variables in the cost function of manufacturer because the 
pulp is the main raw material for producing tissue. 





























































































































































































Note:  Retailer margins are calculated by subtracting wholesale price from 
retail price and dividing by retail price. These do not take into account 
retailer’s other costs than wholesale price such as labor cost.
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Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the data with a 
comparison of before and after the merger. We have some interesting 
observations. Although Scott is classified as an economy brand 
(Hausman and Leonard 1997), its unit price is the highest among 
the six brands. This may be attributed to Scott’s package size. 
The package size of the other brands is normally four whereas 
Scott’s products consist of one roll. Quantity discount practice 
seems to make Scott’s unit price look higher than that of the other 
brands. Second, after the merger the retail and wholesale prices of 
Kleenex went down while all the other brands’ retail and wholesale 
prices rose. In addition, Kleenex’s promotion activities increased 
by 69% post-merger. This may imply that Kleenex marketed its 
products aggressively to expand its market share. Its strategies 
seem successful. The quantity sold grew by 130%, and the market 
share doubled. At the same time, after the merger the retail price 
for Kleenex dropped more than the decrease of the wholesale 
price. Scott, Kimberly’s another brand, shows records opposite 
of Kleenex’s. Not only sales but market share fell by 30%. The 
standard deviation of sales decreased sharply. We guess Kimberly 
focused on boosting the sales of Kleenex. Consequently Scott’s 
sales dropped. However, Scott’s sales stabilized because regular 
consumers who liked Scott continuously bought Scott’s products. 
Finally, we evaluate the statistics for Kimberly’s competitors; we 
observe interesting contrast between two brands, Charmin and 
Quilted Northern. Charmin manufactured by P&G was the pre-
merger market leader while Quilted Northern produced by James 
River Corporation (acquired by Georgia-Pacific in 2000) was the 
post-merger leader. It appears that Quilted Northern acted more 
competitively and took a softer stance towards the retailer in 
response to the merger between its rivals. Quilted Northern provided 
the retailer with a much greater margin compared to Charmin. 
Moreover, the former increased promotions by 40% whereas the 
latter cut promotions by 38%. Another aggressive brand is a private 
label, Dominick’s. The retailer enjoyed a much higher margin from 
its private label—almost 30%—than the national brands, but the 
margin shrank considerably after the merger. Also, the promotion 
for the store brand soared by 155%. It seems that the retailer 
marketed its store-brand aggressively at the expense of its margin.
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RESULTS
Table 2 presents the parameter estimates and the standard errors 
for the mean effects of brand preferences, price sensitivity, and deal 
sensitivity. The price and deal sensitivity appear to have expected 
signs and are statistically significant. Some of the interaction 
terms are also statistically significantly. Specifically, the direction 
of interactions between income and the store brand preference is 
predictable. The estimates for the interactions between income and 
the private label is -1.123. This means that the preference for this 
brand is higher in the areas with lower incomes. It makes sense 
that consumers with lower than average income prefer the store 
brand to national brands. The interaction between income and 
price sensitivity is also statistically significantly different from zero, 
and the sign of this term is positive as expected. It is a reasonable 
result that consumers residing in the higher-than-average are less 
sensitive to price.  
Table 3 reports the estimates and the standard errors for the 
heterogeneity parameters in the demand equation. Only two 
estimates, brand preference for Charmin and price sensitivity, are 
statistically significant. The other five estimates are insignificant. 
This results seems to suggest that consumer preference ordering is 
stable. That is, the level of differentiation appears low in this market, 
and each brand does not seem to give a distinct value to consumers. 
Instead, consumers are likely to habitually purchase the same 
brand as one they purchased previously. This is consistent with the 
fact that the ranking of brands in market share was stable over the 
estimation period. There is, however, an exception; Kleenex ranked 
the third after the merger, rising from the fifth before the merger.
The rise of Kleenex’s market share is attributed to the decrease 
in its retail price. Note that only Kleenex’s average retail price 
declined after the merger whereas that of the other brands rose. 
Thus, some consumers who liked Kleenex, but did not buy it due 
to its high price were likely to switch to Kleenex. This idea seems to 
be supported by the results of the price elasticity estimates. Table 
4 presents the cross-price elasticity matrix. The elasticities were 
computed for each store week and then averaged across store week. 
We compute standard errors of the elasticity estimates using a 
bootstrap procedure. We draw values from the estimated variance-
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Table 2. Mean Preference and Response Parameter Estimates
Variable Parameter estimate Standard error
Angel Soft 
Angel Soft × Fraction educated
Angel Soft × Median income
Angel Soft × Family size
Angel Soft × Fraction unemployed
Angel Soft × Driving time
Kleenex
Kleenex × Fraction educated
Kleenex × Median income
Kleenex × Family size
Kleenex × Fraction unemployed
Kleenex × Driving time
Charmin
Charmin × Fraction educated
Charmin × Median income
Charmin × Family size
Charmin × Fraction unemployed
Charmin × Driving time
Store brand
Store × Fraction educated
Store × Median income
Store × Family size
Store × Fraction unemployed
Store × Driving time
Quilted Northern
Quilted Northern × Fraction educated
Quilted Northern × Median income
Quilted Northern × Family size
Quilted Northern × Fraction unemployed
Quilted Northern × Driving time
Scott
Scott × Fraction educated
Scott × Median income
Scott × Family size
Scott × Fraction unemployed
Scott × Driving time
Price
Price × Fraction educated
Price × Median income
Price × Family size
Price × Fraction unemployed
























































































Note:  Estimates of time dummies are not reported. All seven dummies are 
statistically significant at the 5% level of significance.
* Significant at the 5% level of significance
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covariance matrix of the parameter estimates and computed the 
implied variances of the elasticity estimates as done in Song and 
Chintagunta (2006). The post-merger elasticities of other brands 
with respect to Kleenex’s price are all statistically significant. That 
is, some of consumers who used to buy other brands switched to 
Kleenex after the merger.  
Turning to the results in table 3, the statistically significant 
estimate for price sensitivity suggests that consumers are 
considerably heterogeneous in price sensitivities. While some 
consumers are likely to buy products without discount, others tend 
to purchase products when they are discounted. Some of these 
price-sensitive consumers probably switch to Kleenex after the 
merger. 
In summary, consumers are not much heterogeneous in brand 
preferences, except for one brand. On the other hands, consumers 
show a high degree of heterogeneity in price sensitivity, which means 
that very price-sensitive consumers exist in the market. In addition, 
the own-elasticities of toilet tissue brands are relatively high. 
According to Tellis (1988), the average own-elasticity is -1.76 across 
categories. The elasticities of all the brands in the analysis are 
greater than this. Compared with the averages for detergent (-2.77) 
and toiletries (-1.38) that seem to have similar characteristics—
commodity and storable goods—the elasticities of toilet tissue 
brands are still larger. With all these results—homogeneous brand 
preferences and large own-elasticities—taken into account, it implies 
that competition between manufacturers seems very intense in the 
toilet tissue market. 
For the supply side results, we first compare the model fit to data 
Table 3. Heterogeneity Parameter Estimates






















* Significant at the 5% level of significance
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for the four different pricing equations, and then discuss the results 
from the best-fitting model. Table 5 summarizes the minimized 
sum of squared errors for each model and test statistics. It appears 
that the model incorporating conduct parameters fits the data best, 
when the smallest sums of squared errors are taken into account. 
The test statistics also supports the model as the best-fitting game. 
That is, all the three discrete games―vertical Nash, manufacturer-
Stackelberg, and retailer-Stackelberg―are rejected in favor of the 
Table 4. Price Elasticities
A. Before



































































































































































Note:  Effect of row prices on column shares. Numbers in parentheses are 
standard errors.
* Significant at the 5% level of significance
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conduct parameter specification. Following Kadiyali et al. (2000), 
we infer the best-fitting game based on the likelihood-ratio test for 
nested hypothesis and Vuong (1989) test for nonnested hypothesis. 
The Vuong test statistic is as follows:
manufacturers seems very intense in the toilet tissue market. 
For the supply side results, we first compare the model fit to data for 
the four different pricing equations, and then discuss the results from the 
best-fitting model. Table 5 summarizes the minimized sum of squared errors 
for each model and test statistics. It appears that the model incorporating 
conduct parameters fits the data best, when the smallest sums of squared 
errors are taken into account. The test statistics also supports the model as 
the best-fitting game. That is, all the three discrete games vertical Nash, 
manufacturer-Stackelberg, and retailer-Stackelberg are rejected in favor of the 
conduct parameter specification. Following Kadiyali et al. (2000), we infer the 
best-fitting game based on the likelihood-ratio test for nested hypothesis and 
Vuong (1989) test for nonnested hypothesis. The Vuong test statistic is as 
follows:
,
where n is the number of observation,  and  are likelihood values of two 
nonnested models, and  and  are the number of parameters in each model, 
respectively.  follows the standard normal distribution. If  is greater than 
the pre-determined critical value, then the model corresponding to g is 
rejected in favor of the model corresponding to f. The values of  for two 
nonnested games, manufacturer-Stackelberg and retailer-Stackelberg, are larger 
than the critical value of the 5% significance level (1.64). Thus, the conduct 
parameter specification describes the pricing behavior of the channel members 
best.
---------------------------------
Insert table 5 about here
---------------------------------
Table 6 reports the estimation results from the supply side model. We 
assume the pricing decision for store brands are non-strategic in the sense 
that the retailer has the sole control on the pricing of the brand. So we 
assume that the conduct parameters related to store brands are zero. As 
  
where n is the number of observation, f and g are likelihood 
values of two nonnested models, and p and q are the number of 
parameters in each model, respectively. V follows the standard 
normal distribution. If V is greater than the pre-determined critical 
value, then the model corresponding to g is rejected in favor of the 
Table 5. Model Fit Statistics
Model
Before After
























































Note:  The three discrete games are tested against the conduct parameter 
mod l. 
* χ2 (6 degrees of freedom) critical value = 12.59
** χ2 (8 degrees of freedom) critical value = 15.51
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model corresponding to f. The values of V for two nonnested games, 
manufacturer-Stackelberg and retailer-Stackelberg, are larger 
than the critical value of the 5% significance level (1.64). Thus, the 
conduct parameter specification describes the pricing behavior of 
the channel members best.
Table 6 reports the estimation results from the supply side model. 
We assume the pricing decision for store brands are non-strategic 
in the sense that the retailer has the sole control on the pricing 
of the brand. So we assume that the conduct parameters related 
to store brands are zero. As presented in the table, many conduct 
parameters are estimated to be statistically significant, implying 
that the pricing setting in the category is not well explained by the 
vertical Nash game. Recall that the vertical Nash game is nested 
in the conduct parameter model: when θ equals zero, the game 
is vertical Nash. The conduct parameters in the retailer’s pricing 
equation are all positive, indicating that the retailer behaves in 
a more accommodating manner than in a vertical Nash game. 
However, some conduct parameters in the manufacturers’ pricing 
equations are estimated to be negative, indicating that those 







































































Note:  as-Angel Soft, kl-Kleenex, ch-Charmin, sb-Store brand, qn-Quilted 
Northern, sc-Scott.
* Significant at the 5% level of significance
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manufacturers may set their prices more aggressively than in a 
vertical Nash game. 
Probably the most important observation we want to make from 
the table is the change in the estimated conducts with the merger. 
For the retailer side, there is no sign reversal with the merger. All 
conducts are positive before and after merger. We do have a few sign 
reversal cases for the manufacturers. First, Kleenex’s conduct, θ8, 
is positive before the merger but becomes negative after the merger. 
That is, Kimberly-Clark set Kleenex prices in an accommodating 
manner before the merger but starts to price more aggressively after 
the merger. It turns out that the merger is related to a larger pricing 
power for Kimberly-Clark. We have a similar observation for Scott 
brand. The conduct for Scott, θ12, shows a similar change pattern 
as Kleenex. Combined together, we can conclude that the merger 
between Kleenex and Scott brings more pricing power toward the 
merged manufacturer. Note that we do not observe such a dramatic 
sign reversal for other brands than Kleenex and Scott. As for this 
particular category, the possible increase in pricing power for the 
manufacturers seems to be limited to the merged manufacturers 
only. Instead, Angel Soft appears to become softer after the merger 
as indicated by the change in its conduct parameter θ7.
CONCLUSION
This paper empirically studies the channel interactions before 
and after a horizontal merger between manufacturers. We apply the 
random coefficient logit model to specify the demand. Employing 
the notion of equilibrium, we also specify the pricing behavior of 
both retailer and manufacturer. We test three discrete games—
vertical Nash, manufacturer Stackelberg, and retailer Stackelberg. 
In addition to testing these scenarios, we also estimate a conduct 
parameter model. The model selection test supports the conduct 
parameter model. 
The results from the conduct parameter estimates show that the 
competitive landscape for the wholesale market of toilet tissue has 
changed as a result of the merger between Kimberly and Scott. We 
find that the interaction between channel members is not fixed and 
can change depending on the market structure. Consistent with 
our intuition, the merged manufacturer in this cagtegory takes a 
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tougher stance toward the retailer with the merger. This implies that 
a horizontal merger between influential manufacturers could be a 
threat to a retailer.  
There are some limitations to our research. First, we do not 
consider interactions between manufacturers. The assumption of 
Bertrand Nash between manufacturers might not be realistic as 
reported Sudhir (2001) and Kadiyali et al. (2000). Actually, some 
big manufacturers in the paper industry have been accused of 
raising and fixing prices in the commercial markets (Telegraph 
Herald 1997), and the Justice Department investigated possible 
anti-competitive practices among paper companies (New York 
Times 1994). Although the suspicion was limited in the commercial 
market, there is a possibility that toilet tissue companies collusively 
set price in the consumer market as well. 
Second, because of the multi-market contact nature, studying 
several categories might be required to reveal the nature of retailer-
manufacturer interaction more completely. Big consumer goods 
manufacturers commonly interact with the retailer in multiple 
categories. Generally, many consumer goods companies are in 
rivalry in various markets. For example, Kimberly competes against 
P&G in markets other than toilet tissue such as facial tissue and 
paper towel. They might keep an eye on the other party’s behavior, 
and consider other competing markets when they develop a strategy 
for one market, resulting in multi-market contact behaviors. Thus, 
the fact that they supply products to several categories might affect 
the relationship with retailer. Manufacturers might endure losses 
in one category for gains in other categories. In this sense, this 
research can be extended to analyzing several categories at the same 
time. 
In summary, our study measures how a horizontal merger 
between manufacturers change the pricing behavior of retailer and 
manufacturers. This study seems to generate reasonable results 
that help marketing managers better understand the nature of the 
interactions between channel members. 
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